1. 18 Apr, 2007 1 commit
  2. 17 Apr, 2007 1 commit
  3. 07 Mar, 2007 3 commits
  4. 12 Feb, 2007 1 commit
  5. 11 Feb, 2007 1 commit
  6. 08 Feb, 2007 1 commit
  7. 06 Dec, 2006 1 commit
  8. 02 Dec, 2006 2 commits
  9. 12 Oct, 2006 1 commit
    • Venkat Yekkirala's avatar
      IPsec: correct semantics for SELinux policy matching · 5b368e61
      Venkat Yekkirala authored
      Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
      context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
      the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
      otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
      policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
      IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
      SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
      so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
      xfrm(s) applied.
      The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
      "deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
      default" in the above case.
      This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
      was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
      confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
      appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
      With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
      policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
      specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
      SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).
      Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
      security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
      such as -EINVAL.  We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
      inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
      xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
      associated with an xfrm policy.
      The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
      correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
      from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
      Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
      fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
      cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
      indicates that the packet can pass freely).  This also forces any future
      lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
      for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
      flow cache entry).
      This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.
      This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
      rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
      with the IPSec policy rule.
      Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
      the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
      is now handled properly.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarVenkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
  10. 28 Sep, 2006 1 commit
  11. 22 Sep, 2006 4 commits
  12. 30 Jun, 2006 1 commit
  13. 17 Jun, 2006 1 commit
    • Catherine Zhang's avatar
      [LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize · c8c05a8e
      Catherine Zhang authored
      This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security
      contexts to IPsec policies and security associations.  In the previous
      patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to
      SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security
      assocations with security contexts.  Thus a user authorized to change
      SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply
      deleteing policies with security contexts.  To fix this security hole,
      an additional authorization check is added for removing security
      policies and security associations with security contexts.
      Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on
      policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change
      unconditionally.  The hook is called on deletion when no context is
      present, which we may want to change.  At present, I left it up to the
      LSM changes:
      The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and
      xfrm_state_delete.  The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion
      of IPsec policies that have security contexts.  The existing hooks
      xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the
      authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and
      memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM
      The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are
      deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy,
      xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete).
      SELinux changes:
      The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
      Acked-by: default avatarJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
  14. 20 Mar, 2006 2 commits
  15. 23 Feb, 2006 1 commit
  16. 24 Jan, 2006 1 commit
  17. 11 Jan, 2006 1 commit
  18. 09 Jan, 2006 1 commit
  19. 03 Jan, 2006 2 commits
    • Eric Dumazet's avatar
      [NET]: move struct proto_ops to const · 90ddc4f0
      Eric Dumazet authored
      I noticed that some of 'struct proto_ops' used in the kernel may share
      a cache line used by locks or other heavily modified data. (default
      linker alignement is 32 bytes, and L1_CACHE_LINE is 64 or 128 at
      This patch makes sure a 'struct proto_ops' can be declared as const,
      so that all cpus can share all parts of it without false sharing.
      This is not mandatory : a driver can still use a read/write structure
      if it needs to (and eventually a __read_mostly)
      I made a global stubstitute to change all existing occurences to make
      them const.
      This should reduce the possibility of false sharing on SMP, and
      speedup some socket system calls.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
    • Trent Jaeger's avatar
      [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. · df71837d
      Trent Jaeger authored
      This patch series implements per packet access control via the
      extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in
      the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security
      associations to label packets.  Extensions to the SELinux LSM are
      included that leverage the patch for this purpose.
      This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem,
      pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a
      socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security
      association) to send/receive network packets.
      Patch purpose:
      The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on
      the strongly authenticated IPSec security association.  Such access
      controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP
      address.  The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be
      spoofed.  By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote
      hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism.
      This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application
      if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to
      enforce the access control policy.
      Patch design approach:
      The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by
      user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a
      security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM
      subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via
      security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those
      A presentation available at
      from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach.
      Patch implementation details:
      On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or
      xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of
      the socket and the same security context is required for resultant
      security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in
      ipsec-tools).  This is enforced in xfrm_state_find.
      On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket
      (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must
      also match the security association being used.
      The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec.
      The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as
      Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is
      minimal.  The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the
      combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec
      processing proceeds as in the original case.
      The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools.  ipsec-tools have
      been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version
      0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security
      associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation
      using the security contexts via racoon.
      The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set
      security contexts.  These programs are also available from me, and
      contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing
      this interface.  Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel
      Signed-off-by: default avatarTrent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
  20. 08 Oct, 2005 1 commit
  21. 05 Oct, 2005 1 commit
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  23. 20 Jun, 2005 2 commits
  24. 18 Jun, 2005 5 commits
  25. 16 Apr, 2005 1 commit
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Linux-2.6.12-rc2 · 1da177e4
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
      even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
      archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
      3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
      git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
      infrastructure for it.
      Let it rip!