GitLab

This code is ugly, but it's working.

Tested with basic module, and appears to be working
properly. I will soon incorporate the patched
modprobe into the kernel tree, and then this code
will be usable by everyone.

The ipc code is still unimplemented. The only
hypercall handled is yield. Also note that other
exit conditions (e.g. external interrupt) have not
been fully tested.

Overview:
-- kernel code calls lcd_create_as_module with
   the module's name
-- lcd_create_as_module loads the module using
   request_lcd_module (request_lcd_module calls
   the patched modprobe to load the module, and
   the patched modprobe calls back into the lcd
   driver via the ioctrl interface to load the
   module)
-- lcd_create_as_module then finds the loaded
   module, spawns a kernel thread and passes off
   the module to it
-- the kernel thread initializes the lcd and
   maps the module inside it, then suspends itself
-- lcd_run_as_module wakes up the kernel thread
   and tells it to run
-- lcd_delete_as_module stops the kernel thread
   and deletes the module from the host kernel

File-by-file details:

arch/x86/include/asm/lcd-domains-arch.h
arch/x86/lcd-domains/lcd-domains-arch-tests.c
arch/x86/lcd-domains/lcd-domains-arch.c
-- lcd was not running in 64-bit mode, and my
   checks had one subtle bug
-- fixed %cr3 load to properly load vmcs first
-- fixed set program counter to use guest virtual
   rather than guest physical address

include/linux/sched.h
-- added struct lcd to task_struct

include/linux/init_task.h
-- lcd pointer set to null when task_struct is
   initialized

include/linux/module.h
kernel/module.c
-- made init_module and delete_module system calls
   callable from kernel code
-- available in module.h via do_sys_init_module and
   do_sys_delete_module
-- simply moved the majority of the guts of the
   system calls into a non-system call, exported
   routine
-- take an extra flag, for_lcd; when set, the init
   code skips over running (and deallocating) the
   module's init code, and the delete code skips
   over running the module exit
-- system calls from user code set for_lcd = 0; this
   ensures existing code still works

include/linux/kmod.h
kernel/kmod.c
kernel/sysctl.c
-- changed __request_module to __do_request_module; takes
   one extra argument, for_lcd
-- __request_module   ==>  __do_request_module with for_lcd = 0
-- request_lcd_module ==>  __do_request_module with for_lcd = 1
-- call_modprobe conditionally uses lcd_modprobe_path, the path
   to a patched modprobe accessible via sysfs

include/lcd-domains/lcd-domains.h
-- added lcd status enum; see source code doc
-- three routines for creating/running/destroying
   lcd's that use modules; see source code doc

include/uapi/linux/lcd-domains.h
-- added interface defns for patched modprobe to call into
   lcd driver for module init; lcd driver loads
   module (via slightly refactored module.c code) on behalf
   of modprobe

virt/lcd-domains/lcd-domains.c
-- implementation of routines for modules inside lcd's
-- implementation of module init / delete for lcd's
   (uses patched module.c code)

virt/lcd-domains/Kconfig
virt/lcd-domains/Makefile
virt/lcd-domains/lcd-module-load-test.c
virt/lcd-domains/lcd-tests.c
-- added test module for lcd module code
-- test runs automatically when lcd module is inserted

We have scripts which write to certain fields on 3.18 kernels but this
seems to be failing on 4.4 kernels.  An entry which we write to here is
xfrm_aevent_rseqth which is u32.

  echo 4294967295  > /proc/sys/net/core/xfrm_aevent_rseqth

Commit 230633d1 ("kernel/sysctl.c: detect overflows when converting
to int") prevented writing to sysctl entries when integer overflow
occurs.  However, this does not apply to unsigned integers.

Heinrich suggested that we introduce a new option to handle 64 bit
limits and set min as 0 and max as UINT_MAX.  This might not work as it
leads to issues similar to __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax.  Alternatively,
we would need to change the datatype of the entry to 64 bit.

  static int __do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(void *data, struct ctl_table
  {
      i = (unsigned long *) data;   //This cast is causing to read beyond the size of data (u32)
      vleft = table->maxlen / sizeof(unsigned long); //vleft is 0 because maxlen is sizeof(u32) which is lesser than sizeof(unsigned long) on x86_64.

Introduce a new proc handler proc_douintvec.  Individual proc entries
will need to be updated to use the new handler.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Fixes: 230633d1 ("kernel/sysctl.c:detect overflows when converting to int")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1471479806-5252-1-git-send-email-subashab@codeaurora.orgSigned-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add a "printk.devkmsg" kernel command line parameter which controls how
userspace writes into /dev/kmsg.  It has three options:

 * ratelimit - ratelimit logging from userspace.
 * on  - unlimited logging from userspace
 * off - logging from userspace gets ignored

The default setting is to ratelimit the messages written to it.

This changes the kernel default setting of "on" to "ratelimit" and we do
that because we want to keep userspace spamming /dev/kmsg to sane
levels.  This is especially moot when a small kernel log buffer wraps
around and messages get lost.  So the ratelimiting setting should be a
sane setting where kernel messages should have a bit higher chance of
survival from all the spamming.

It additionally does not limit logging to /dev/kmsg while the system is
booting if we haven't disabled it on the command line.

Furthermore, we can control the logging from a lower priority sysctl
interface - kernel.printk_devkmsg.

That interface will succeed only if printk.devkmsg *hasn't* been
supplied on the command line.  If it has, then printk.devkmsg is a
one-time setting which remains for the duration of the system lifetime.
This "locking" of the setting is to prevent userspace from changing the
logging on us through sysctl(2).

This patch is based on previous patches from Linus and Steven.

[bp@suse.de: fixes]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160719072344.GC25563@nazgul.tnic
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160716061745.15795-3-bp@alien8.deSigned-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Franck Bui <fbui@suse.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

As reclaim is now per-node based, convert zone_reclaim to be
node_reclaim.  It is possible that a node will be reclaimed multiple
times if it has multiple zones but this is unavoidable without caching
all nodes traversed so far.  The documentation and interface to
userspace is the same from a configuration perspective and will will be
similar in behaviour unless the node-local allocation requests were also
limited to lower zones.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1467970510-21195-24-git-send-email-mgorman@techsingularity.netSigned-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

It is not always easy to determine the cause of an RCU stall just by
analysing the RCU stall messages, mainly when the problem is caused
by the indirect starvation of rcu threads. For example, when preempt_rcu
is not awakened due to the starvation of a timer softirq.

We have been hard coding panic() in the RCU stall functions for
some time while testing the kernel-rt. But this is not possible in
some scenarios, like when supporting customers.

This patch implements the sysctl kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall. If
set to 1, the system will panic() when an RCU stall takes place,
enabling the capture of a vmcore. The vmcore provides a way to analyze
all kernel/tasks states, helping out to point to the culprit and the
solution for the stall.

The kernel.panic_on_rcu_stall sysctl is disabled by default.

Changes from v1:
- Fixed a typo in the git log
- The if(sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall) panic() is in a static function
- Fixed the CONFIG_TINY_RCU compilation issue
- The var sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall is now __read_mostly

Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Tested-by: "Luis Claudio R. Goncalves" <lgoncalv@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Provide /proc/sys/vm/stat_refresh to force an immediate update of
per-cpu into global vmstats: useful to avoid a sleep(2) or whatever
before checking counts when testing.  Originally added to work around a
bug which left counts stranded indefinitely on a cpu going idle (an
inaccuracy magnified when small below-batch numbers represent "huge"
amounts of memory), but I believe that bug is now fixed: nonetheless,
this is still a useful knob.

Its schedule_on_each_cpu() is probably too expensive just to fold into
reading /proc/meminfo itself: give this mode 0600 to prevent abuse.
Allow a write or a read to do the same: nothing to read, but "grep -h
Shmem /proc/sys/vm/stat_refresh /proc/meminfo" is convenient.  Oh, and
since global_page_state() itself is careful to disguise any underflow as
0, hack in an "Invalid argument" and pr_warn() if a counter is negative
after the refresh - this helped to fix a misaccounting of
NR_ISOLATED_FILE in my migration code.

But on recent kernels, I find that NR_ALLOC_BATCH and NR_PAGES_SCANNED
often go negative some of the time.  I have not yet worked out why, but
have no evidence that it's actually harmful.  Punt for the moment by
just ignoring the anomaly on those.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
Cc: Ning Qu <quning@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The perf_sample->ip_callchain->nr value includes all the entries in the
ip_callchain->ip[] array, real addresses and PERF_CONTEXT_{KERNEL,USER,etc},
while what the user expects is that what is in the kernel.perf_event_max_stack
sysctl or in the upcoming per event perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack knob be
honoured in terms of IP addresses in the stack trace.

So allocate a bunch of extra entries for contexts, and do the accounting
via perf_callchain_entry_ctx struct members.

A new sysctl, kernel.perf_event_max_contexts_per_stack is also
introduced for investigating possible bugs in the callchain
implementation by some arch.

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-3b4wnqk340c4sg4gwkfdi9yk@git.kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

So that it can be used for other stack related knobs, such as the
upcoming one to tweak the max number of of contexts per stack sample.

In all those cases we can only change the value if there are no perf
sessions collecting stacks, so they need to grab that mutex, etc.

Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-8t3fk94wuzp8m2z1n4gc0s17@git.kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

The default remains 127, which is good for most cases, and not even hit
most of the time, but then for some cases, as reported by Brendan, 1024+
deep frames are appearing on the radar for things like groovy, ruby.

And in some workloads putting a _lower_ cap on this may make sense. One
that is per event still needs to be put in place tho.

The new file is:

  # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
  127

Chaging it:

  # echo 256 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
  # cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
  256

But as soon as there is some event using callchains we get:

  # echo 512 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
  -bash: echo: write error: Device or resource busy
  #

Because we only allocate the callchain percpu data structures when there
is a user, which allows for changing the max easily, its just a matter
of having no callchain users at that point.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160426002928.GB16708@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

In machines with 140G of memory and enterprise flash storage, we have
seen read and write bursts routinely exceed the kswapd watermarks and
cause thundering herds in direct reclaim.  Unfortunately, the only way
to tune kswapd aggressiveness is through adjusting min_free_kbytes - the
system's emergency reserves - which is entirely unrelated to the
system's latency requirements.  In order to get kswapd to maintain a
250M buffer of free memory, the emergency reserves need to be set to 1G.
That is a lot of memory wasted for no good reason.

On the other hand, it's reasonable to assume that allocation bursts and
overall allocation concurrency scale with memory capacity, so it makes
sense to make kswapd aggressiveness a function of that as well.

Change the kswapd watermark scale factor from the currently fixed 25% of
the tunable emergency reserve to a tunable 0.1% of memory.

Beyond 1G of memory, this will produce bigger watermark steps than the
current formula in default settings.  Ensure that the new formula never
chooses steps smaller than that, i.e.  25% of the emergency reserve.

On a 140G machine, this raises the default watermark steps - the
distance between min and low, and low and high - from 16M to 143M.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

schedstats is very useful during debugging and performance tuning but it
incurs overhead to calculate the stats. As such, even though it can be
disabled at build time, it is often enabled as the information is useful.

This patch adds a kernel command-line and sysctl tunable to enable or
disable schedstats on demand (when it's built in). It is disabled
by default as someone who knows they need it can also learn to enable
it when necessary.

The benefits are dependent on how scheduler-intensive the workload is.
If it is then the patch reduces the number of cycles spent calculating
the stats with a small benefit from reducing the cache footprint of the
scheduler.

These measurements were taken from a 48-core 2-socket
machine with Xeon(R) E5-2670 v3 cpus although they were also tested on a
single socket machine 8-core machine with Intel i7-3770 processors.

netperf-tcp
                           4.5.0-rc1             4.5.0-rc1
                             vanilla          nostats-v3r1
Hmean    64         560.45 (  0.00%)      575.98 (  2.77%)
Hmean    128        766.66 (  0.00%)      795.79 (  3.80%)
Hmean    256        950.51 (  0.00%)      981.50 (  3.26%)
Hmean    1024      1433.25 (  0.00%)     1466.51 (  2.32%)
Hmean    2048      2810.54 (  0.00%)     2879.75 (  2.46%)
Hmean    3312      4618.18 (  0.00%)     4682.09 (  1.38%)
Hmean    4096      5306.42 (  0.00%)     5346.39 (  0.75%)
Hmean    8192     10581.44 (  0.00%)    10698.15 (  1.10%)
Hmean    16384    18857.70 (  0.00%)    18937.61 (  0.42%)

Small gains here, UDP_STREAM showed nothing intresting and neither did
the TCP_RR tests. The gains on the 8-core machine were very similar.

tbench4
                                 4.5.0-rc1             4.5.0-rc1
                                   vanilla          nostats-v3r1
Hmean    mb/sec-1         500.85 (  0.00%)      522.43 (  4.31%)
Hmean    mb/sec-2         984.66 (  0.00%)     1018.19 (  3.41%)
Hmean    mb/sec-4        1827.91 (  0.00%)     1847.78 (  1.09%)
Hmean    mb/sec-8        3561.36 (  0.00%)     3611.28 (  1.40%)
Hmean    mb/sec-16       5824.52 (  0.00%)     5929.03 (  1.79%)
Hmean    mb/sec-32      10943.10 (  0.00%)    10802.83 ( -1.28%)
Hmean    mb/sec-64      15950.81 (  0.00%)    16211.31 (  1.63%)
Hmean    mb/sec-128     15302.17 (  0.00%)    15445.11 (  0.93%)
Hmean    mb/sec-256     14866.18 (  0.00%)    15088.73 (  1.50%)
Hmean    mb/sec-512     15223.31 (  0.00%)    15373.69 (  0.99%)
Hmean    mb/sec-1024    14574.25 (  0.00%)    14598.02 (  0.16%)
Hmean    mb/sec-2048    13569.02 (  0.00%)    13733.86 (  1.21%)
Hmean    mb/sec-3072    12865.98 (  0.00%)    13209.23 (  2.67%)

Small gains of 2-4% at low thread counts and otherwise flat.  The
gains on the 8-core machine were slightly different

tbench4 on 8-core i7-3770 single socket machine
Hmean    mb/sec-1        442.59 (  0.00%)      448.73 (  1.39%)
Hmean    mb/sec-2        796.68 (  0.00%)      794.39 ( -0.29%)
Hmean    mb/sec-4       1322.52 (  0.00%)     1343.66 (  1.60%)
Hmean    mb/sec-8       2611.65 (  0.00%)     2694.86 (  3.19%)
Hmean    mb/sec-16      2537.07 (  0.00%)     2609.34 (  2.85%)
Hmean    mb/sec-32      2506.02 (  0.00%)     2578.18 (  2.88%)
Hmean    mb/sec-64      2511.06 (  0.00%)     2569.16 (  2.31%)
Hmean    mb/sec-128     2313.38 (  0.00%)     2395.50 (  3.55%)
Hmean    mb/sec-256     2110.04 (  0.00%)     2177.45 (  3.19%)
Hmean    mb/sec-512     2072.51 (  0.00%)     2053.97 ( -0.89%)

In constract, this shows a relatively steady 2-3% gain at higher thread
counts. Due to the nature of the patch and the type of workload, it's
not a surprise that the result will depend on the CPU used.

hackbench-pipes
                         4.5.0-rc1             4.5.0-rc1
                           vanilla          nostats-v3r1
Amean    1        0.0637 (  0.00%)      0.0660 ( -3.59%)
Amean    4        0.1229 (  0.00%)      0.1181 (  3.84%)
Amean    7        0.1921 (  0.00%)      0.1911 (  0.52%)
Amean    12       0.3117 (  0.00%)      0.2923 (  6.23%)
Amean    21       0.4050 (  0.00%)      0.3899 (  3.74%)
Amean    30       0.4586 (  0.00%)      0.4433 (  3.33%)
Amean    48       0.5910 (  0.00%)      0.5694 (  3.65%)
Amean    79       0.8663 (  0.00%)      0.8626 (  0.43%)
Amean    110      1.1543 (  0.00%)      1.1517 (  0.22%)
Amean    141      1.4457 (  0.00%)      1.4290 (  1.16%)
Amean    172      1.7090 (  0.00%)      1.6924 (  0.97%)
Amean    192      1.9126 (  0.00%)      1.9089 (  0.19%)

Some small gains and losses and while the variance data is not included,
it's close to the noise. The UMA machine did not show anything particularly
different

pipetest
                             4.5.0-rc1             4.5.0-rc1
                               vanilla          nostats-v2r2
Min         Time        4.13 (  0.00%)        3.99 (  3.39%)
1st-qrtle   Time        4.38 (  0.00%)        4.27 (  2.51%)
2nd-qrtle   Time        4.46 (  0.00%)        4.39 (  1.57%)
3rd-qrtle   Time        4.56 (  0.00%)        4.51 (  1.10%)
Max-90%     Time        4.67 (  0.00%)        4.60 (  1.50%)
Max-93%     Time        4.71 (  0.00%)        4.65 (  1.27%)
Max-95%     Time        4.74 (  0.00%)        4.71 (  0.63%)
Max-99%     Time        4.88 (  0.00%)        4.79 (  1.84%)
Max         Time        4.93 (  0.00%)        4.83 (  2.03%)
Mean        Time        4.48 (  0.00%)        4.39 (  1.91%)
Best99%Mean Time        4.47 (  0.00%)        4.39 (  1.91%)
Best95%Mean Time        4.46 (  0.00%)        4.38 (  1.93%)
Best90%Mean Time        4.45 (  0.00%)        4.36 (  1.98%)
Best50%Mean Time        4.36 (  0.00%)        4.25 (  2.49%)
Best10%Mean Time        4.23 (  0.00%)        4.10 (  3.13%)
Best5%Mean  Time        4.19 (  0.00%)        4.06 (  3.20%)
Best1%Mean  Time        4.13 (  0.00%)        4.00 (  3.39%)

Small improvement and similar gains were seen on the UMA machine.

The gain is small but it stands to reason that doing less work in the
scheduler is a good thing. The downside is that the lack of schedstats and
tracepoints may be surprising to experts doing performance analysis until
they find the existence of the schedstats= parameter or schedstats sysctl.
It will be automatically activated for latencytop and sleep profiling to
alleviate the problem. For tracepoints, there is a simple warning as it's
not safe to activate schedstats in the context when it's known the tracepoint
may be wanted but is unavailable.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1454663316-22048-1-git-send-email-mgorman@techsingularity.netSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

SYSCTL_WRITES_WARN was added in commit f4aacea2 ("sysctl: allow for
strict write position handling"), and released in v3.16 in August of
2014.  Since then I can find only 1 instance of non-zero offset
writing[1], and it was fixed immediately in CRIU[2].  As such, it
appears safe to flip this to the strict state now.

[1] https://www.google.com/search?q="when%20file%20position%20was%20not%200"
[2] http://lists.openvz.org/pipermail/criu/2015-April/019819.htmlSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.

This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.

The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).

Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to
exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security
vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data
which could help an attack.  This is done by adding a random offset to
the location of regions in the process address space, with a greater
range of potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a
larger search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for
fragmentation.

The offset added to the mmap_base address, which provides the basis for
the majority of the mappings for a process, is set once on process exec
in arch_pick_mmap_layout() and is done via hard-coded per-arch values,
which reflect, hopefully, the best compromise for all systems.  The
trade-off between increased entropy in the offset value generation and
the corresponding increased variability in address space fragmentation
is not absolute, however, and some platforms may tolerate higher amounts
of entropy.  This patch introduces both new Kconfig values and a sysctl
interface which may be used to change the amount of entropy used for
offset generation on a system.

The direct motivation for this change was in response to the
libstagefright vulnerabilities that affected Android, specifically to
information provided by Google's project zero at:

  http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/09/stagefrightened.html

The attack presented therein, by Google's project zero, specifically
targeted the limited randomness used to generate the offset added to the
mmap_base address in order to craft a brute-force-based attack.
Concretely, the attack was against the mediaserver process, which was
limited to respawning every 5 seconds, on an arm device.  The hard-coded
8 bits used resulted in an average expected success rate of defeating
the mmap ASLR after just over 10 minutes (128 tries at 5 seconds a
piece).  With this patch, and an accompanying increase in the entropy
value to 16 bits, the same attack would take an average expected time of
over 45 hours (32768 tries), which makes it both less feasible and more
likely to be noticed.

The introduced Kconfig and sysctl options are limited by per-arch
minimum and maximum values, the minimum of which was chosen to match the
current hard-coded value and the maximum of which was chosen so as to
give the greatest flexibility without generating an invalid mmap_base
address, generally a 3-4 bits less than the number of bits in the
user-space accessible virtual address space.

When decided whether or not to change the default value, a system
developer should consider that mmap_base address could be placed
anywhere up to 2^(value) bits away from the non-randomized location,
which would introduce variable-sized areas above and below the mmap_base
address such that the maximum vm_area_struct size may be reduced,
preventing very large allocations.

This patch (of 4):

ASLR only uses as few as 8 bits to generate the random offset for the
mmap base address on 32 bit architectures.  This value was chosen to
prevent a poorly chosen value from dividing the address space in such a
way as to prevent large allocations.  This may not be an issue on all
platforms.  Allow the specification of a minimum number of bits so that
platforms desiring greater ASLR protection may determine where to place
the trade-off.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Cashman <dcashman@google.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

The only way to enable a hardlockup to panic the machine is to set
'nmi_watchdog=panic' on the kernel command line.

This makes it awkward for end users and folks who want to run automate
tests (like myself).

Mimic the softlockup_panic knob and create a /proc/sys/kernel/hardlockup_panic
knob.
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In many cases of hardlockup reports, it's actually not possible to know
why it triggered, because the CPU that got stuck is usually waiting on a
resource (with IRQs disabled) in posession of some other CPU is holding.

IOW, we are often looking at the stacktrace of the victim and not the
actual offender.

Introduce sysctl / cmdline parameter that makes it possible to have
hardlockup detector perform all-CPU backtrace.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs
teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks.
Verifier will prevent
- any arithmetic on pointers
  (except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses)
- comparison of pointers
  (except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... )
- passing pointers to helper functions
- indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions
- returning pointer from bpf program
- storing pointers into ctx or maps

Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling
of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not.

Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to
be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc
but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside
or obfuscate them.

Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs,
so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration)
and future kcm can use it.
tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions,
since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers
and tc is for root only.

For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed:
int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
  u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol));
  u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index);

  if (value)
	*value += skb->len;
  return 0;
}

but the following program is not:
int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
  u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol));
  u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index);

  if (value)
	*value += (u64) skb;
  return 0;
}
since it would leak the kernel address into the map.

Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the
following helper functions:
- map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them)
- get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space)
- get_smp_processor_id
- tail_call into another socket filter program
- ktime_get_ns

The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled.
This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1).  Once true,
bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process,
and the toggle cannot be set back to false.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The following

    if (val < 0)
        *lvalp = (unsigned long)-val;

is incorrect because the compiler is free to assume -val to be positive
and use a sign-extend instruction for extending the bit pattern.  This is
a problem if val == INT_MIN:

    # echo -2147483648 >/proc/sys/dev/scsi/logging_level
    # cat /proc/sys/dev/scsi/logging_level
    -18446744071562067968

Cast to unsigned long before negation - that way we first sign-extend and
then negate an unsigned, which is well defined.  With this:

    # cat /proc/sys/dev/scsi/logging_level
    -2147483648
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@twibright.com>
Cc: Robert Xiao <nneonneo@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

There are two kexec load syscalls, kexec_load another and kexec_file_load.
 kexec_file_load has been splited as kernel/kexec_file.c.  In this patch I
split kexec_load syscall code to kernel/kexec.c.

And add a new kconfig option KEXEC_CORE, so we can disable kexec_load and
use kexec_file_load only, or vice verse.

The original requirement is from Ted Ts'o, he want kexec kernel signature
being checked with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.  But kexec-tools use
kexec_load syscall can bypass the checking.

Vivek Goyal proposed to create a common kconfig option so user can compile
in only one syscall for loading kexec kernel.  KEXEC/KEXEC_FILE selects
KEXEC_CORE so that old config files still work.

Because there's general code need CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE, so I updated all the
architecture Kconfig with a new option KEXEC_CORE, and let KEXEC selects
KEXEC_CORE in arch Kconfig.  Also updated general kernel code with to
kexec_load syscall.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add a magic sysctl table sysctl_mount_point that when used to
create a directory forces that directory to be permanently empty.

Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when accessing permanently
empty directories.

Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.

Update /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc to be a permanently empty directory.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>

Change the default behavior of watchdog so it only runs on the
housekeeping cores when nohz_full is enabled at build and boot time.
Allow modifying the set of cores the watchdog is currently running on
with a new kernel.watchdog_cpumask sysctl.

In the current system, the watchdog subsystem runs a periodic timer that
schedules the watchdog kthread to run.  However, nohz_full cores are
designed to allow userspace application code running on those cores to
have 100% access to the CPU.  So the watchdog system prevents the
nohz_full application code from being able to run the way it wants to,
thus the motivation to suppress the watchdog on nohz_full cores, which
this patchset provides by default.

However, if we disable the watchdog globally, then the housekeeping
cores can't benefit from the watchdog functionality.  So we allow
disabling it only on some cores.  See Documentation/lockup-watchdogs.txt
for more information.

[jhubbard@nvidia.com: fix a watchdog crash in some configurations]
Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Eric reported that the timer_migration sysctl is not really nice
performance wise as it needs to check at every timer insertion whether
the feature is enabled or not. Further the check does not live in the
timer code, so we have an extra function call which checks an extra
cache line to figure out that it is disabled.

We can do better and store that information in the per cpu (hr)timer
bases. I pondered to use a static key, but that's a nightmare to
update from the nohz code and the timer base cache line is hot anyway
when we select a timer base.

The old logic enabled the timer migration unconditionally if
CONFIG_NO_HZ was set even if nohz was disabled on the kernel command
line.

With this modification, we start off with migration disabled. The user
visible sysctl is still set to enabled. If the kernel switches to NOHZ
migration is enabled, if the user did not disable it via the sysctl
prior to the switch. If nohz=off is on the kernel command line,
migration stays disabled no matter what.

Before:
  47.76%  hog       [.] main
  14.84%  [kernel]  [k] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave
   9.55%  [kernel]  [k] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore
   6.71%  [kernel]  [k] mod_timer
   6.24%  [kernel]  [k] lock_timer_base.isra.38
   3.76%  [kernel]  [k] detach_if_pending
   3.71%  [kernel]  [k] del_timer
   2.50%  [kernel]  [k] internal_add_timer
   1.51%  [kernel]  [k] get_nohz_timer_target
   1.28%  [kernel]  [k] __internal_add_timer
   0.78%  [kernel]  [k] timerfn
   0.48%  [kernel]  [k] wake_up_nohz_cpu

After:
  48.10%  hog       [.] main
  15.25%  [kernel]  [k] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave
   9.76%  [kernel]  [k] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore
   6.50%  [kernel]  [k] mod_timer
   6.44%  [kernel]  [k] lock_timer_base.isra.38
   3.87%  [kernel]  [k] detach_if_pending
   3.80%  [kernel]  [k] del_timer
   2.67%  [kernel]  [k] internal_add_timer
   1.33%  [kernel]  [k] __internal_add_timer
   0.73%  [kernel]  [k] timerfn
   0.54%  [kernel]  [k] wake_up_nohz_cpu
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Joonwoo Park <joonwoop@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Wenbo Wang <wenbo.wang@memblaze.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150526224512.127050787@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

When converting unsigned long to int overflows may occur.  These currently
are not detected when writing to the sysctl file system.

E.g. on a system where int has 32 bits and long has 64 bits
  echo 0x800001234 > /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max
has the same effect as
  echo 0x1234 > /proc/sys/kernel/threads-max

The patch adds the missing check in do_proc_dointvec_conv.

With the patch an overflow will result in an error EINVAL when writing to
the the sysctl file system.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Users can change the maximum number of threads by writing to
/proc/sys/kernel/threads-max.

With the patch the value entered is checked against the same limits that
apply when fork_init is called.
Signed-off-by: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Currently, pages which are marked as unevictable are protected from
compaction, but not from other types of migration.  The POSIX real time
extension explicitly states that mlock() will prevent a major page
fault, but the spirit of this is that mlock() should give a process the
ability to control sources of latency, including minor page faults.
However, the mlock manpage only explicitly says that a locked page will
not be written to swap and this can cause some confusion.  The
compaction code today does not give a developer who wants to avoid swap
but wants to have large contiguous areas available any method to achieve
this state.  This patch introduces a sysctl for controlling compaction
behavior with respect to the unevictable lru.  Users who demand no page
faults after a page is present can set compact_unevictable_allowed to 0
and users who need the large contiguous areas can enable compaction on
locked memory by leaving the default value of 1.

To illustrate this problem I wrote a quick test program that mmaps a
large number of 1MB files filled with random data.  These maps are
created locked and read only.  Then every other mmap is unmapped and I
attempt to allocate huge pages to the static huge page pool.  When the
compact_unevictable_allowed sysctl is 0, I cannot allocate hugepages
after fragmenting memory.  When the value is set to 1, allocations
succeed.
Signed-off-by: Eric B Munson <emunson@akamai.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

With the current user interface of the watchdog mechanism it is only
possible to disable or enable both lockup detectors at the same time.
This series introduces new kernel parameters and changes the semantics of
some existing kernel parameters, so that the hard lockup detector and the
soft lockup detector can be disabled or enabled individually.  With this
series applied, the user interface is as follows.

- parameters in /proc/sys/kernel

  . soft_watchdog
    This is a new parameter to control and examine the run state of
    the soft lockup detector.

  . nmi_watchdog
    The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used
    to control and examine the run state of the hard lockup detector.

  . watchdog
    This parameter is still available to control the run state of both
    lockup detectors at the same time. If this parameter is examined,
    it shows the logical OR of soft_watchdog and nmi_watchdog.

  . watchdog_thresh
    The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch.

- kernel command line parameters

  . nosoftlockup
    The semantics of this parameter have changed. It can now be used
    to disable the soft lockup detector at boot time.

  . nmi_watchdog=0 or nmi_watchdog=1
    Disable or enable the hard lockup detector at boot time. The patch
    introduces '=1' as a new option.

  . nowatchdog
    The semantics of this parameter are not affected by the patch. It
    is still available to disable both lockup detectors at boot time.

Also, remove the proc_dowatchdog() function which is no longer needed.

[dzickus@redhat.com: wrote changelog]
[dzickus@redhat.com: update documentation for kernel params and sysctl]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

struct kiocb now is a generic I/O container, so move it to fs.h.
Also do a #include diet for aio.h while we're at it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Add a tuning knob so we can adjust the dirtytime expiration timeout,
which is very useful for testing lazytime.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>

Commit ed4d4902 ("mm, hugetlb: remove hugetlb_zero and
hugetlb_infinity") replaced 'unsigned long hugetlb_zero' with 'int zero'
leading to out-of-bounds access in proc_doulongvec_minmax().  Use
'.extra1 = NULL' instead of '.extra1 = &zero'.  Passing NULL is
equivalent to passing minimal value, which is 0 for unsigned types.

Fixes: ed4d4902 ("mm, hugetlb: remove hugetlb_zero and hugetlb_infinity")
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Suggested-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add the kernel command line tp_printk option that will have tracepoints
that are active sent to printk() as well as to the trace buffer.

Passing "tp_printk" will activate this. To turn it off, the sysctl
/proc/sys/kernel/tracepoint_printk can have '0' echoed into it. Note,
this only works if the cmdline option is used. Echoing 1 into the sysctl
file without the cmdline option will have no affect.

Note, this is a dangerous option. Having high frequency tracepoints send
their data to printk() can possibly cause a live lock. This is another
reason why this is only active if the command line option is used.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.11.1412121539300.16494@nanosSuggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

There have been several times where I have had to rebuild a kernel to
cause a panic when hitting a WARN() in the code in order to get a crash
dump from a system.  Sometimes this is easy to do, other times (such as
in the case of a remote admin) it is not trivial to send new images to
the user.

A much easier method would be a switch to change the WARN() over to a
panic.  This makes debugging easier in that I can now test the actual
image the WARN() was seen on and I do not have to engage in remote
debugging.

This patch adds a panic_on_warn kernel parameter and
/proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn calls panic() in the
warn_slowpath_common() path.  The function will still print out the
location of the warning.

An example of the panic_on_warn output:

The first line below is from the WARN_ON() to output the WARN_ON()'s
location.  After that the panic() output is displayed.

    WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 11698 at /home/prarit/dummy_module/dummy-module.c:25 init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]()
    Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...

    CPU: 30 PID: 11698 Comm: insmod Tainted: G        W  OE  3.17.0+ #57
    Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600CP/S2600CP, BIOS RMLSDP.86I.00.29.D696.1311111329 11/11/2013
     0000000000000000 000000008e3f87df ffff88080f093c38 ffffffff81665190
     0000000000000000 ffffffff818aea3d ffff88080f093cb8 ffffffff8165e2ec
     ffffffff00000008 ffff88080f093cc8 ffff88080f093c68 000000008e3f87df
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff81665190>] dump_stack+0x46/0x58
     [<ffffffff8165e2ec>] panic+0xd0/0x204
     [<ffffffffa038e05f>] ? init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]
     [<ffffffff81076b90>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd0/0xd0
     [<ffffffffa038e040>] ? dummy_greetings+0x40/0x40 [dummy_module]
     [<ffffffff81076c8a>] warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
     [<ffffffffa038e05f>] init_dummy+0x1f/0x30 [dummy_module]
     [<ffffffff81002144>] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x210
     [<ffffffff811b52c2>] ? __vunmap+0xc2/0x110
     [<ffffffff810f8889>] load_module+0x16a9/0x1b30
     [<ffffffff810f3d30>] ? store_uevent+0x70/0x70
     [<ffffffff810f49b9>] ? copy_module_from_fd.isra.44+0x129/0x180
     [<ffffffff810f8ec6>] SyS_finit_module+0xa6/0xd0
     [<ffffffff8166cf29>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x17

Successfully tested by me.

hpa said: There is another very valid use for this: many operators would
rather a machine shuts down than being potentially compromised either
functionally or security-wise.
Signed-off-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Acked-by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

File /proc/sys/kernel/numa_balancing_scan_size_mb allows writing of zero.

This bash command reproduces problem:

$ while :; do echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/numa_balancing_scan_size_mb; \
	   echo 256 > /proc/sys/kernel/numa_balancing_scan_size_mb; done

	divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP
	Modules linked in:
	CPU: 0 PID: 24112 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.17.0+ #8
	Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
	task: ffff88013c852600 ti: ffff880037a68000 task.ti: ffff880037a68000
	RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81074191>]  [<ffffffff81074191>] task_scan_min+0x21/0x50
	RSP: 0000:ffff880037a6bce0  EFLAGS: 00010246
	RAX: 0000000000000a00 RBX: 00000000000003e8 RCX: 0000000000000000
	RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88013c852600
	RBP: ffff880037a6bcf0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000015c90
	R10: ffff880239bf6c00 R11: 0000000000000016 R12: 0000000000003fff
	R13: ffff88013c852600 R14: ffffea0008d1b000 R15: 0000000000000003
	FS:  00007f12bb048700(0000) GS:ffff88007da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
	CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
	CR2: 0000000001505678 CR3: 0000000234770000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
	Stack:
	 ffff88013c852600 0000000000003fff ffff880037a6bd18 ffffffff810741d1
	 ffff88013c852600 0000000000003fff 000000000002bfff ffff880037a6bda8
	 ffffffff81077ef7 ffffea0008a56d40 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
	Call Trace:
	 [<ffffffff810741d1>] task_scan_max+0x11/0x40
	 [<ffffffff81077ef7>] task_numa_fault+0x1f7/0xae0
	 [<ffffffff8115a896>] ? migrate_misplaced_page+0x276/0x300
	 [<ffffffff81134a4d>] handle_mm_fault+0x62d/0xba0
	 [<ffffffff8103e2f1>] __do_page_fault+0x191/0x510
	 [<ffffffff81030122>] ? native_smp_send_reschedule+0x42/0x60
	 [<ffffffff8106dc00>] ? check_preempt_curr+0x80/0xa0
	 [<ffffffff8107092c>] ? wake_up_new_task+0x11c/0x1a0
	 [<ffffffff8104887d>] ? do_fork+0x14d/0x340
	 [<ffffffff811799bb>] ? get_unused_fd_flags+0x2b/0x30
	 [<ffffffff811799df>] ? __fd_install+0x1f/0x60
	 [<ffffffff8103e67c>] do_page_fault+0xc/0x10
	 [<ffffffff8150d322>] page_fault+0x22/0x30
	RIP  [<ffffffff81074191>] task_scan_min+0x21/0x50
	RSP <ffff880037a6bce0>
	---[ end trace 9a826d16936c04de ]---

Also fix race in task_scan_min (it depends on compiler behaviour).
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1413455977.24793.78.camel@tkhaiSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

The deprecation warnings for the scan_unevictable interface triggers by
scripts doing `sysctl -a | grep something else'.  This is annoying and not
helpful.

The interface has been defunct since 264e56d8 ("mm: disable user
interface to manually rescue unevictable pages"), which was in 2011, and
there haven't been any reports of usecases for it, only reports that the
deprecation warnings are annying.  It's unlikely that anybody is using
this interface specifically at this point, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This commit changes rcutorture_runnable to torture_runnable, which is
consistent with the names of the other parameters and is a bit shorter
as well.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

They are unnecessary: "zero" can be used in place of "hugetlb_zero" and
passing extra2 == NULL is equivalent to infinity.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

A 'softlockup' is defined as a bug that causes the kernel to loop in
kernel mode for more than a predefined period to time, without giving
other tasks a chance to run.

Currently, upon detection of this condition by the per-cpu watchdog
task, debug information (including a stack trace) is sent to the system
log.

On some occasions, we have observed that the "victim" rather than the
actual "culprit" (i.e.  the owner/holder of the contended resource) is
reported to the user.  Often this information has proven to be
insufficient to assist debugging efforts.

To avoid loss of useful debug information, for architectures which
support NMI, this patch makes it possible to improve soft lockup
reporting.  This is accomplished by issuing an NMI to each cpu to obtain
a stack trace.

If NMI is not supported we just revert back to the old method.  A sysctl
and boot-time parameter is available to toggle this feature.

[dzickus@redhat.com: add CONFIG_SMP in certain areas]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: additional CONFIG_SMP=n optimisations]
[mq@suse.cz: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Moskyto Matejka <mq@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Oleg reports a division by zero error on zero-length write() to the
percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl:

    divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
    CPU: 1 PID: 9142 Comm: badarea_io Not tainted 3.15.0-rc2-vm-nfs+ #19
    Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    task: ffff8800d5aeb6e0 ti: ffff8800d87a2000 task.ti: ffff8800d87a2000
    RIP: 0010: percpu_pagelist_fraction_sysctl_handler+0x84/0x120
    RSP: 0018:ffff8800d87a3e78  EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000f89 RBX: ffff88011f7fd000 RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000010
    RBP: ffff8800d87a3e98 R08: ffffffff81d002c8 R09: ffff8800d87a3f50
    R10: 000000000000000b R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000060
    R13: ffffffff81c3c3e0 R14: ffffffff81cfddf8 R15: ffff8801193b0800
    FS:  00007f614f1e9740(0000) GS:ffff88011f440000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
    CR2: 00007f614f1fa000 CR3: 00000000d9291000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
    Call Trace:
      proc_sys_call_handler+0xb3/0xc0
      proc_sys_write+0x14/0x20
      vfs_write+0xba/0x1e0
      SyS_write+0x46/0xb0
      tracesys+0xe1/0xe6

However, if the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl is set by the user, it
is also impossible to restore it to the kernel default since the user
cannot write 0 to the sysctl.

This patch allows the user to write 0 to restore the default behavior.
It still requires a fraction equal to or larger than 8, however, as
stated by the documentation for sanity.  If a value in the range [1, 7]
is written, the sysctl will return EINVAL.

This successfully solves the divide by zero issue at the same time.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: Oleg Drokin <green@linuxhacker.ru>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This typedef is unnecessary and should just be removed.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When writing to a sysctl string, each write, regardless of VFS position,
begins writing the string from the start.  This means the contents of
the last write to the sysctl controls the string contents instead of the
first:

  open("/proc/sys/kernel/modprobe", O_WRONLY)   = 1
  write(1, "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"..., 4096) = 4096
  write(1, "/bin/true", 9)                = 9
  close(1)                                = 0

  $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe
  /bin/true

Expected behaviour would be to have the sysctl be "AAAA..." capped at
maxlen (in this case KMOD_PATH_LEN: 256), instead of truncating to the
contents of the second write.  Similarly, multiple short writes would
not append to the sysctl.

The old behavior is unlike regular POSIX files enough that doing audits
of software that interact with sysctls can end up in unexpected or
dangerous situations.  For example, "as long as the input starts with a
trusted path" turns out to be an insufficient filter, as what must also
happen is for the input to be entirely contained in a single write
syscall -- not a common consideration, especially for high level tools.

This provides kernel.sysctl_writes_strict as a way to make this behavior
act in a less surprising manner for strings, and disallows non-zero file
position when writing numeric sysctls (similar to what is already done
when reading from non-zero file positions).  For now, the default (0) is
to warn about non-zero file position use, but retain the legacy
behavior.  Setting this to -1 disables the warning, and setting this to
1 enables the file position respecting behavior.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: move misplaced hunk, per Randy]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>