1. 21 Jul, 2009 1 commit
  2. 06 Jul, 2009 1 commit
  3. 29 Jun, 2009 2 commits
  4. 26 Jun, 2009 3 commits
  5. 24 Jun, 2009 7 commits
  6. 21 Jun, 2009 24 commits
  7. 20 Jun, 2009 2 commits
    • Johannes Weiner's avatar
      mm: page_alloc: clear PG_locked before checking flags on free · c277331d
      Johannes Weiner authored
      da456f14
      
       "page allocator: do not disable interrupts in free_page_mlock()" moved
      the PG_mlocked clearing after the flag sanity checking which makes mlocked
      pages always trigger 'bad page'.  Fix this by clearing the bit up front.
      Reported--and-debugged-by: default avatarPeter Chubb <peter.chubb@nicta.com.au>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Acked-by: default avatarMel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
      Tested-by: default avatarMaxim Levitsky <maximlevitsky@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c277331d
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      x86, 64-bit: Clean up user address masking · 9063c61f
      Linus Torvalds authored
      The discussion about using "access_ok()" in get_user_pages_fast() (see
      commit 7f818906
      
      : "x86: don't use
      'access_ok()' as a range check in get_user_pages_fast()" for details and
      end result), made us notice that x86-64 was really being very sloppy
      about virtual address checking.
      
      So be way more careful and straightforward about masking x86-64 virtual
      addresses:
      
       - All the VIRTUAL_MASK* variants now cover half of the address
         space, it's not like we can use the full mask on a signed
         integer, and the larger mask just invites mistakes when
         applying it to either half of the 48-bit address space.
      
       - /proc/kcore's kc_offset_to_vaddr() becomes a lot more
         obvious when it transforms a file offset into a
         (kernel-half) virtual address.
      
       - Unify/simplify the 32-bit and 64-bit USER_DS definition to
         be based on TASK_SIZE_MAX.
      
      This cleanup and more careful/obvious user virtual address checking also
      uncovered a buglet in the x86-64 implementation of strnlen_user(): it
      would do an "access_ok()" check on the whole potential area, even if the
      string itself was much shorter, and thus return an error even for valid
      strings. Our sloppy checking had hidden this.
      
      So this fixes 'strnlen_user()' to do this properly, the same way we
      already handled user strings in 'strncpy_from_user()'.  Namely by just
      checking the first byte, and then relying on fault handling for the
      rest.  That always works, since we impose a guard page that cannot be
      mapped at the end of the user space address space (and even if we
      didn't, we'd have the address space hole).
      Acked-by: default avatarIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
      Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
      Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      9063c61f