1. 04 Jul, 2015 36 commits
  2. 03 Jul, 2015 4 commits
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'topic/drm-fixes-2015-07-04' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm-intel · 5c65e7be
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull drm EDID fix from Daniel Vetter:
       "Since Dave is enjoying vacation I figured I'll send you this drm core
        fix directly"
      * tag 'topic/drm-fixes-2015-07-04' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm-intel:
        drm/crtc: Fix edid length computation
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost · 5fc83528
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull virtio/vhost cross endian support from Michael Tsirkin:
       "I have just queued some more bugfix patches today but none fix
        regressions and none are related to these ones, so it looks like a
        good time for a merge for -rc1.
        The motivation for this is support for legacy BE guests on the new LE
        hosts.  There are two redeeming properties that made me merge this:
         - It's a trivial amount of code: since we wrap host/guest accesses
           anyway, almost all of it is well hidden from drivers.
         - Sane platforms would never set flags like VHOST_CROSS_ENDIAN_LEGACY,
           and when it's clear, there's zero overhead (as some point it was
           tested by compiling with and without the patches, got the same
           stripped binary).
        Maybe we could create a Kconfig symbol to enforce the second point:
        prevent people from enabling it eg on x86.  I will look into this"
      * tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost:
        virtio-pci: alloc only resources actually used.
        macvtap/tun: cross-endian support for little-endian hosts
        vhost: cross-endian support for legacy devices
        virtio: add explicit big-endian support to memory accessors
        vhost: introduce vhost_is_little_endian() helper
        vringh: introduce vringh_is_little_endian() helper
        macvtap: introduce macvtap_is_little_endian() helper
        tun: add tun_is_little_endian() helper
        virtio: introduce virtio_is_little_endian() helper
    • Shixin Zeng's avatar
      drm/crtc: Fix edid length computation · e24ff467
      Shixin Zeng authored
      The length of each EDID block is EDID_LENGTH, and number of blocks is
      (1 + edid->extensions) - we need to multiply not add them.
      This causes wrong EDID to be passed on, and is a regression introduced
      by d2ed3436 (drm: Introduce helper for replacing blob properties)
      Signed-off-by: default avatarShixin Zeng <zeng.shixin@gmail.com>
      Cc: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
      Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
      Reviewed-by: default avatarDaniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
      [danvet: Add Cc: and fix commit summary.]
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDaniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
    • Linus Torvalds's avatar
      Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace · 0cbee992
      Linus Torvalds authored
      Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
       "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
        that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
        permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
        if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.
        Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
        be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
        proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
        sysfs.  Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.
        There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement.  Only filesystems
        mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
        the test for empty directories was insufficient.  So in my tree
        directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
        created specially.  Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
        directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
        shows that the directory is empty.  Special creation of directories
        for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
        it's purpose.  I asked container developers from the various container
        projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
        points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.
        This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
        mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
        proc and sysfs.  I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
        unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
        proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
        on the previous mount of proc and sysfs.  So for now only the atime,
        read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
        consistent are enforced.  Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
        attributes remains for another time.
        This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
        descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed.  Recently readlink of
        /proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
        meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
        converted) and is not now actively wrong.
        There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
        I will mention briefly.
        It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
        At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
        be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem.  With user
        namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
        allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
        to outside of the bind mount.  This is challenging to fix and doubly
        so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
        performance part of pathname resolution.
        As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
        developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
        files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
        in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
        such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
        they are recognized"
      * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
        vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
        mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
        sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
        sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
        kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
        proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
        sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
        fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
        vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
        mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
        mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace