Merge branch 'bpf-unprivileged'
Alexei Starovoitov says: ==================== bpf: unprivileged v1-v2: - this set logically depends on cb patch "bpf: fix cb access in socket filter programs": http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/527391/ which is must have to allow unprivileged programs. Thanks Daniel for finding that issue. - refactored sysctl to be similar to 'modules_disabled' - dropped bpf_trace_printk - split tests into separate patch and added more tests based on discussion v1 cover letter: I think it is time to liberate eBPF from CAP_SYS_ADMIN. As was discussed when eBPF was first introduced two years ago the only piece missing in eBPF verifier is 'pointer leak detection' to make it available to non-root users. Patch 1 adds this pointer analysis. The eBPF programs, obviously, need to see and operate on kernel addresses, but with these extra checks they won't be able to pass these addresses to user space. Patch 2 adds accounting of kernel memory used by programs and maps. It changes behavoir for existing root users, but I think it needs to be done consistently for both root and non-root, since today programs and maps are only limited by number of open FDs (RLIMIT_NOFILE). Patch 2 accounts program's and map's kernel memory as RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Unprivileged eBPF is only meaningful for 'socket filter'-like programs. eBPF programs for tracing and TC classifiers/actions will stay root only. In parallel the bpf fuzzing effort is ongoing and so far we've found only one verifier bug and that was already fixed. The 'constant blinding' pass also being worked on. It will obfuscate constant-like values that are part of eBPF ISA to make jit spraying attacks even harder. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <email@example.com>
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