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    security/selinux: fix /proc/sys/ labeling · 8e6c9693
    Lucian Adrian Grijincu authored
    This fixes an old (2007) selinux regression: filesystem labeling for
    /proc/sys returned
         -r--r--r-- unknown                          /proc/sys/fs/file-nr
    instead of
         -r--r--r-- system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t:s0 /proc/sys/fs/file-nr
    
    Events that lead to breaking of /proc/sys/ selinux labeling:
    
    1) sysctl was reimplemented to route all calls through /proc/sys/
    
        commit 77b14db5
        [PATCH] sysctl: reimplement the sysctl proc support
    
    2) proc_dir_entry was removed from ctl_table:
    
        commit 3fbfa981
        [PATCH] sysctl: remove the proc_dir_entry member for the sysctl tables
    
    3) selinux still walked the proc_dir_entry tree to apply
       labeling. Because ctl_tables don't have a proc_dir_entry, we did
       not label /proc/sys/ inodes any more. To achieve this the /proc/sys/
       inodes were marked private and private inodes were ignored by
       selinux.
    
        commit bbaca6c2
        [PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes
    
        commit 86a71dbd
    
    
        [PATCH] sysctl: hide the sysctl proc inodes from selinux
    
    Access control checks have been done by means of a special sysctl hook
    that was called for read/write accesses to any /proc/sys/ entry.
    
    We don't have to do this because, instead of walking the
    proc_dir_entry tree we can walk the dentry tree (as done in this
    patch). With this patch:
    * we don't mark /proc/sys/ inodes as private
    * we don't need the sysclt security hook
    * we walk the dentry tree to find the path to the inode.
    
    We have to strip the PID in /proc/PID/ entries that have a
    proc_dir_entry because selinux does not know how to label paths like
    '/1/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and defaults to 'proc_t' labeling). Selinux does
    know of '/net/rpc/nfsd.fh' (and applies the 'sysctl_rpc_t' label).
    
    PID stripping from the path was done implicitly in the previous code
    because the proc_dir_entry tree had the root in '/net' in the example
    from above. The dentry tree has the root in '/1'.
    
    Signed-off-by: default avatarEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarLucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
    Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
    8e6c9693