Commit 6dcb6468 authored by Robert Ricci's avatar Robert Ricci
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Added information about root passwords, which machines should share them,

and which should not. Also filled in a few minor omissions in other sections.

*** Please comment ***
parent 4d5114ce
......@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ be done to enhance it:
2) Firewalling:
2.1) Block outgoing connections from testbed nodes to the CS network
- This is because something on this network may have (misguided)
trust in them (especially paper/plastic)
trust in them (especially paper/plastic) (note: This may be less
important when we're on our own subnets, as CS shouldn't be trusting
them at all)
2.2) May want to block outgoing connections on specific ports to all
IPs - for example, the SMTP port, to prevent people from using
testbed nodes as spam mailhubs. Then again, this may be too
......@@ -19,24 +21,44 @@ be done to enhance it:
3) Filesystems:
3.1) Home directories should be exported only to nodes currently
running experiments that the user is involved in (will be secure
because of 1.1)
because of item 1.1)
3.2) Home directories on Plastic should be mounted with the 'nosuid'
and 'nodev' options on plastic and paper - users could, on their
test nodes, create set-uid root programs, or make device nodes
that they are allowed to read an write to.
3.3) Remove suidperl binary on plastic (doesn't get installed on
latest FreeBSD versions anyway) - See FreeBSD mount manpage for
reason. Related to 3.2
reason. Related to item 3.2
3.4) All testbed nodes, and plastic (any maybe paper too?) should
NOT be able to mount our NFS server(s) or CS's. Could happen
either through firewalling or rules on the NFS servers.
4) Policies:
4.1) Flux'ers accounts on plastic and testbed nodes should not have
4) Passwords
4.1) Testbed node root passwords are problematic. Testbed nodes
should definitely have a root password that is not used anywhere
else. Maybe they should have no root password (an invalid hash,
not a blank one) and just trust paper to login as root via ssh.
If someone who has local_root for a project crack a node's root
password, then they can get root on other project's nodes, or the
same node later, when another project owns it. Then again, maybe
we don't need to set our security stanards quite that high.
4.2) It would be reasonable to share a root password between paper
and the Cisco's. Having root on paper will mean that someone will
have access through SNMP, etc. to the ciscos, and having the
enable passwork to the ciscos will allow someone to bypass our
protections in section 1 and spoof paper, so they are essentailly
equivalent.
4.3) Plastic should have a unique root password - we don't want to
have it the same as the testbed nodes (easy access to crack), but
we want to make root compromise of plastic not lead to the root
compromise of paper.
5) User policies:
5.1) Flux'ers accounts on plastic and testbed nodes should not have
stanard passwords (people may be able to get encrypted string and
crack)
4.2) No accounts on plastic should have 'special priviledges' - we
5.2) No accounts on plastic should have 'special priviledges' - we
need to assume that any account on plastic can be compromised
4.3) NO special passwords should be typed on plastic or the testbed
5.3) NO special passwords should be typed on plastic or the testbed
nodes. This means don't telnet to the switches, ssh to any
machines other than the testbed nodes, etc.
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